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The Right of Access to Environmental Information and Legal 
Transplant Theory: Lessons from London and Beijing 
 
Sean Whittaker * 
 
Abstract: This article analyzes the potential for legal transplant theory to strengthen the legal 
regimes guaranteeing the right of access to environmental information in England and China. 
Guaranteed by the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, the right has had a 
substantial impact on how individuals can act as environmental stewards. However, despite 
the framework provided by the Aarhus Convention, there are shortcomings in how these 
states guarantee the right when compared with the obligations set by the provisions of the 
Convention. The article applies Watson’s legal transplant theory to the environmental 
information regimes in England and China and considers the likelihood of each jurisdiction 
sourcing legal reforms from the other. It also seeks to identify common trends shared by each 
jurisdiction and the impact of the Aarhus Convention on such transplants.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is increasingly recognized by states that the accountability of public authorities is a key 
component of environmental protection efforts. The development of environmental law, as 
enshrined by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development1 and the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention),2 has moved away from traditional ‘command 
and control’ legislation toward public participation as a means of engaging civil society as 
environmental regulators.3 In particular, information disclosure provisions can help to 
minimize the information asymmetry between the state and its citizens. In so doing, 
individuals are empowered in their role as environmental stewards, able to effectively 
participate in environmental decision-making procedures4 and to exert ‘bottom-up’ pressure 
on the State and private entities in their role as consumers and investors.5  
A key player in these developments is the European Union (EU). While states such as 
Sweden, Finland and the United States (US) were the first to guarantee the general right of 
access to information6 which has been replicated throughout the globe,7 it was the EU that 
first recognized the right of access to environmental information in 1990 through Directive 
                                                          
1 Adopted by the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992, 
UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.htm. 
2 Aarhus (Denmark), 25 June 1998, in force 30 Oct. 2001, available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html. 
3 D. Case, ‘The Role of Information in Environmental Justice’ (2011-2012) 81 Mississippi Law Journal, pp. 
701-42, at 704-5. Examples of public participation in environmental matters include reporting potential breaches 
of environmental regulations, participating in environmental decision-making procedures and submitting 
environmental cases to court.    
4 J. Ebbesson et al., The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (2nd edn, United Nations, 2014), p. 19. 
5 J. Rowan-Robinson, A. Ross, W. Walton & J. Rothnie, ‘Public Access to Environmental Information: A 
Means to What End?’ (1996) 8(1) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 19-42, at 19-21. 
6 A key point here is that these access to information regimes were implemented before the creation of the 
Aarhus Convention: Sweden implemented the Freedom of the Press Act in 1766, Finland promulgated the Act 
on the Openness of Public Documents in 1951, and the US implemented the Freedom of Information Act in 
1966. 
7 Currently, there are over 100 national right to information regimes: see V. Lemieux & S. Trapnell, Public 
Access to Information For Development: A Guide to the Effective Implementation of Right to Information Laws 
(The World Bank, 2016), pp. 1-2. 
 
 
90/313/EEC on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment.8 The EU 
continued to play a vital role in the negotiations leading to the creation of the Aarhus 
Convention, which is the keystone instrument that enshrines the right of access to 
environmental information at the international level. Based on Western liberal-democratic 
values and described as a regional convention with global scope,9 the Aarhus Convention 
obliges states to guarantee the right of access to environmental information held by public 
authorities, subject to various exceptions, by linking environmental and human rights.10 The 
Convention’s procedural rights entrench the right of access to environmental information 
within states that are Parties to the Convention, and had a significant influence on how states 
conceptualize the right in their respective environmental information regimes. 
It is under the auspices of the Aarhus Convention that both the United Kingdom (UK) and 
China have guaranteed the right of access to environmental information. However, the 
relationship between the Aarhus Convention and these two jurisdictions differs greatly. The 
UK is a Party to the Aarhus Convention and is obliged as a matter of international law to 
guarantee the procedural rights enshrined in the Convention. This is further entrenched 
through the UK’s (current) membership of the EU, which imposes the obligations of the 
Aarhus Convention through its Party status to the Convention and through Directive 
2003/4/EC on Public Access to Environmental Information.11 There is added complexity in 
how the UK complies with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention and Directive 
2003/4/EC due to differences between the different parts of the UK. The Environmental 
Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) imposes obligations on public authorities to disclose 
environmental information on request in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Public 
                                                          
8 [1990] OJ L 158/56. 
9 S. Stec & S. Casey-Lefkowitz, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (United Nations, 2000), at 
Foreword. 
10 P. Coppel, Information Rights: Law and Practice (4th edn, Hart, 2014), p.184. 
11 [2003] OJ L 41/26.  
 
 
authorities in Scotland are obliged to comply with the Environmental Information (Scotland) 
Regulations 2004, the provisions of which are substantively identical to those of the EIR. 
However, while both sets of instruments are substantively identical the context in which they 
operate in is not. This can be seen in the provision of public utilities, in particular water and 
sewerage services, which is privatized in England and Wales but not in Scotland or Northern 
Ireland. This is significant, as these differences can lead to the regulations having different 
scopes in each constituent country in the UK, depending on the degree of control the state has 
over public utilities in each country. In order to recognise the impact of these differences and 
provide a coherent comparative analysis, the article will focus its analysis on the EIR and its 
implementation in England and Wales.12   
In contrast to the UK, China is not a Party to the Aarhus Convention and is not bound to 
implement the Convention’s approach when guaranteeing the right. Nevertheless, China has 
broadly adopted the principles of the Aarhus Convention in guaranteeing the right of access 
to environmental information13 and there is ongoing academic debate on whether China 
should become a Party to the Convention.14 Thus, regardless of whether states have acceded 
to the Convention or merely draw inspiration from it, the overarching framework provided by 
                                                          
12 For the purposes of narrative clarity throughout the article, the jurisdiction of England and Wales will be 
shortened to England. 
13 Part 6(c), Global and Regional Developments on Issues Related to Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development Statement by Mr Hou, Aarhus Convention Meeting of the Parties 5, Maastricht 
30 Jun – 4 Jul 2014, available at: https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/mop5/Statements/MOP-
5_6c_Statement_China_University_01.pdf. See also Q. Du, ‘Public Participation and the Challenge of 
Environmental Justice in China’, in J. Ebbesson & P. Okowa, Environmental Law and Justice in Context 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 139-57, at 151; and L. Li, ‘Environmental Disclosure in China: A 
Comparative Study to the US and EU System’ Georgetown Environmental Law Review, Online Feature (18 
May 2016), available at: https://gelr.org/2016/05/18/environmental-disclosure-in-china.  
14 EU-China Environmental Governance Programme, ‘Aarhus Convention Workshop Held in Beijing’ (EU-
China Environmental Governance Programme, 5/12/2014), available at: 
http://www.ecegp.com/english/news/shownews.asp?ID=878. 
 
 
the Aarhus Convention informs states throughout the world on how best to guarantee the 
right of access to environmental information.15 
As will be demonstrated below, there are shortcomings in the rules governing access to 
environmental information in both England and China when measured against the standards 
in the Aarhus Convention. These shortcomings have significant impact on how the right 
operates in practice. This article focuses on two particular aspects of the environmental 
information regimes in England and China that lead to deficiencies in application of the right. 
Firstly, it discusses the definitional implications of ‘public authority’ and ‘Government 
department’ and, secondly, it reviews the circumstances in which public authorities may 
withhold information from disclosure. The article contends that legal transplant theory can 
assist in remedying the observed shortcomings that are associated with these two aspects. 
Legal transplant theory helps to make sense of the nature of law and its connection to the 
needs of society,16 and is appropriate for application in this context as it provides a lens 
through which to view legal reforms and gauge their likelihood of being successfully 
adopted. 
This article seeks to highlight both the similarities and the differences between the two 
jurisdictions in how they approach selected aspects of the right of access to environmental 
information and their success in guaranteeing the right when judged against the standards of 
the Aarhus Convention. By highlighting the similarities and differences between the two 
jurisdictions and as against the Convention, the article aims to: (a) identify the different 
approaches that England and China have adopted in the context of the normative framework 
created by the Aarhus Convention; and (b) explain how these approaches impact on the 
                                                          
15 L. Krämer, ‘Transnational Access to Environmental Information’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational Environmental 
Law, pp. 95-104, at 100-1 and U Etemire, ‘Insights on the UNEP Bali Guidelines and the Development of 
Environmental Democratic Rights’ (2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 393-413, at 402-7.  
16 W. Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants’ (1995) 43 American Journal of 
Comparative Law, pp. 489-510, at 499-502. 
 
 
success or otherwise of guaranteeing the right. Additionally, this article uses the lens of legal 
transplant theory to analyze how the legal reforms of the selected environmental information 
regimes that are proposed by this article interact with the normative framework of the Aarhus 
Convention and with the conceptualizations of the right in both jurisdictions. There is scant 
application of legal transplant theory in this area. This article aims to fill in the gap and 
provide insights into which aspects of the right should be treated as: (a) essential to meeting 
the objectives of promoting environmental democratic values; or (b) open to change to fit 
within the legal and political culture of a state.   
The next section introduces legal transplant theory. It discusses the tenets of the theory and 
shows how it can be applied in the context of guaranteeing the right of access to 
environmental information in England and China. The following section identifies how 
England and China have guaranteed the right of access to environmental information, 
focussing on which bodies are subject to the environmental information regime and what 
information is exempt from disclosure. These aspects of the regime were selected because 
they best represent the differences between English and Chinese conceptualizations and 
approaches towards guaranteeing the right of access to environmental information. Legal 
reforms sourced from each jurisdiction are then proposed and the likelihood of the proposed 
transplants being successfully adopted into the receiving legal system is explored. The article 
concludes that it is theoretically possible for England and China to look to each other as 
sources of legal reform to improve how the right is guaranteed, which would have a wider 
positive impact on environmental democracy. However, the article concedes that the cultural 
and political barriers between these states will likely hinder the sourcing and adoption of the 
proposed transplants. 
 
 
 
2. LEGAL TRANSPLANT THEORY 
Law shows us many paradoxes. Perhaps the strangest of all is that, on the one hand, a people’s law can 
be regarded as being special to it, indeed a sign of that people’s identity… [Yet] on the other hand, 
legal transplants - the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one 
people to another – have been common since the earliest recorded history.17 
It is commonly accepted that the laws in a jurisdiction mirror the unique needs of that 
jurisdiction,18 a theory referred to in this article as the ‘mirror theory.’ Originating from the 
legal studies of Montesquieu, the mirror theory denotes the importance of society within the 
local law-making process and precludes the possibility of laws travelling between 
jurisdictions.19 When viewing the law through this theoretical lens, a reasonable assumption 
is that because the specific needs of a society differ in different states due to natural, political 
and legal factors, the laws of one jurisdiction cannot fit the different needs of another. 
However, as identified in the above quote, there is a flaw in Montesquieu’s theory. While 
laws should not easily travel between jurisdictions, there is evidence that ‘foreign’ laws have 
been used as sources of legal reform for various jurisdictions throughout history.20 
Additionally, modern academics have noted that this phenomenon is not restricted to the past: 
the exchange of laws between jurisdictions has increased in the 21st century.21 Consequently, 
Montesquieu’s theory of law mirroring society does not fully explain how law operates in 
reality. 
                                                          
17 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (The University of Georgia Press, 1993), at 
p. 21. 
18 A. Cohler, B. Miller & H. Stone (eds), Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press, 
1989), at p. 25. 
19 Ibid. See also P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4(2) Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, pp.111-24. 
20 An example of this is the incorporation of Roman Law into 15th Century Scotland: Watson, n. 17 above, p. 36. 
21 J. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2008), p. 434. 
 
 
Alan Watson attempts to fill this gap through legal transplant theory. Pioneered in the 
1970s,22 legal transplant theory proposes that law does not reflect the needs of society23 
because the law and the legal institutions of a jurisdiction are created by the ‘legal elite.’24 
The ‘legal elite,’ Watson posits, constitutes a group trained in matters of law which, by virtue 
of that training, is more inclined to rely on legal authority in order to justify the legitimacy of 
their proposals for law reform.25 Consequently, the laws of a state will tend to reflect the 
specific legal desires of the ‘legal elite,’ partially severing the link between the law and the 
needs of society. As a result of this disconnect, jurisdictions are free to look beyond 
indigenous sources of law and source legal reforms from another jurisdiction, even if it holds 
different social or political values. Indeed, Watson describes this as the ‘most fertile source of 
development’26 for legal systems because they are economically efficient,27 allowing the 
‘legal elite’ to build on the experience of the donor jurisdiction and prevent costly errors 
arising from the implementation of unsuitable laws.28 Additionally, the desire to increase the 
legitimacy of the state at the domestic and international level through incorporating 
internationally recognized legal norms into domestic law29 has been identified as a key 
reason for jurisdictions to look beyond their own borders for legal reforms. This is of 
particular importance in the context of the right of access to environmental information 
because the Aarhus Convention acts as the normative international instrument in this area. 
Any domestic environmental information regime which complies with the Convention is seen 
to be effectively implementing the right of access to environmental information.  
                                                          
22 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press, 1974). 
23 A. Watson, The Evolution of Law (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 93. 
24 Ibid., p. 115. The ‘legal elite’ can include jurists, politicians, legal academics and judges. 
25 Watson, n. 17 above, p. 55. 
26 Ibid., p. 95. 
27 A. Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’ (1996) 44(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 335-
51, at 335. 
28 J. Morin & E. Gold, ‘An Integrated Model of Legal Transplantation: The Diffusion of Intellectual Property 
Law in Developing Countries’ (2014) 58 International Studies Quarterly, pp. 781-92, at 782. 
29 Ibid., pp. 782-3. 
 
 
However, the process of looking towards other jurisdictions to source legal reforms is easier 
said than done and raises a plethora of questions that the ‘legal elite’ must answer: firstly, 
how will the jurisdiction source these reforms; secondly, are the selected transplants likely to 
be successfully adopted And; thirdly, will there be unintended consequences? In addressing 
the first two questions, Watson identifies three conditions which must be met for the legal 
transplant to be adopted successfully: the laws being transplanted must be accessible to the 
‘legal elite’;30 they must be respected or perceived as legitimate by the receiving society;31 
and they must not be inappropriate for the receiving society.32 While these conditions 
indicate that a variety of factors affect whether legal transplants are successfully incorporated 
into the receiving legal system, a common theme is that they must not be contrary to the 
needs of society. This is similar to Montesquieu’s theory but differs in one important respect: 
the transplant need not perfectly reflect what society desires; it just needs to not be contrary 
to the values of the receiving society. 
Leading from this, it must be asked why England and China would look towards each other 
as a potential source of legal reform, as they both differ significantly in terms of legal, 
cultural and political attributes. England, similar to other western states, adopts a liberal 
democratic view of state/citizen relations. This view, espoused by academics such as 
Bentham, emphasizes that the state holds information on behalf of the public interest and that 
it is necessary for citizens to hold the state to account to protect against abuses of power.33 In 
contrast, China’s totalitarian rule under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not based on 
liberal-democratic values34 but rather on Marxist doctrines of State/citizen relations.35 Such a 
                                                          
30 Watson, n. 23 above, p. 95. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 118. 
33 J. Bentham, ‘Chapter II: Of Publicity’, in J. Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol 2 (William 
Tait, 1838-1843), s.1(1), pp. 309-12. 
34 E. Larus, Politics & Society in Contemporary China (Lynne Rienner, 2012), p. 108. 
35 K. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (London Lawrence and Wishart, 1875) Part IV, p. 28.  
 
 
political position eschews the virtue of transparency and builds upon China’s Confucian 
tradition of secrecy in matters of governance.36  
However, it can be suggested that because both jurisdictions share a common desire to 
implement the right of access to environmental information, this gap is not an insurmountable 
obstacle to transplanting legal reforms. Indeed, under legal transplant theory these differences 
are a boon since the unfamiliar social views and legal procedures can offer previously 
unthought-of ideas that could not be conceived purely within the receiving jurisdiction’s legal 
system. Additional factors can also bridge the gap between the two jurisdictions. England’s 
Party status to the Aarhus Convention, the prestige of England’s environmental information 
regime which has been praised by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee,37 and the 
accessibility of English as a global language38 help promote aspects of England’s 
Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) to China’s ‘legal elite’ in considering 
legal transplants. Conversely, as a state suffering from severe environmental degradation39 
which only recently has guaranteed the right of access to environmental information, China is 
well placed to experiment with implementing the procedural rights enshrined in the Aarhus 
Convention. In this context, any legal innovations by China may be of interest to England, 
and thus can drive them to consider China as a source of legal reforms under legal transplant 
theory. 
Finally, states may attach particular importance to the question of unintended consequences. 
These consequences are not merely the potential rejection of the proposed transplant. Legal 
                                                          
36 J. Head, ‘Opposing Legal transparency in Dynastic China: The Persuasive Logic of Confucianist Views on 
Legal Opaqueness’, in P. Ala’I & R. Vaughn (eds) Research Handbook on Transparency (Edward Elgar, 2014), 
pp. 115-39, at 123. 
37 Report of the Compliance Committee on its Twenty-Sixth Meeting, Addendum, Findings and 
Recommendations with Regard to Communication ACCC/C/2008/24 Concerning Compliance by Spain, 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/8/Add.1, para. 77, available at: 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CC-26/ece_mp.pp_c.1_2009_8_add.1_e.pdf. 
38 A. Pennycook, The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language (Routledge, 2014), p. 7. 
39 L. Wenjing, ‘Approaching Democracy Through Transparency: A Comparative Law Study of Chinese Open 
Government Information’ (2011) 26(4) American University International Law Review, pp. 983-1007, at 987. 
 
 
transplants may also act to transform the legal system in which they have been transplanted, 
thereby altering characteristics of the receiving system to reflect the legal system of the donor 
State.40 The transformative impact of legal transplants can be substantial, because they can 
subtly introduce legal principles into a jurisdiction that would normally dismiss such 
principles outright. This can be seen to some extent in China’s implementation of the right of 
access to environmental information, which has incorporated Western ideals of transparency 
into the traditionally closed-off system of Chinese governance. However, it must be noted 
that the receiving jurisdiction is not obliged to transplant the proposed reform in full; it can 
certainly amend the provisions of the original law to fit within its own legal system.41 In 
doing so, it is possible for the receiving jurisdiction to minimize the transformative impact of 
the legal transplant. 
3. APPLYING LEGAL TRANSPLANT THEORY TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION REGIMES IN ENGLAND AND CHINA 
3.1. The Aarhus Convention and the Right of Access to Environmental Information in 
England and China 
The Aarhus Convention, as the keystone of the right of access to environmental information, 
is vital to setting the minimum procedural standards42 required to effectively guarantee the 
right. Negotiated by the EU Member States and informed by the Rio Declaration and 
Directive 90/313/EEC, the Aarhus Convention sets out the scope of the right,43 secondary 
procedural rights relating to the request for environmental information,44 and review 
                                                          
40 M. Langer, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalisation of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure’ (2004) 45(1) Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 1-65, at 5. 
41 Watson, n. 17 above, p. 20. 
42 Ebbesson et al, n. 4 above, p. 19. 
43 Art. 2. 
44 Art. 4. 
 
 
procedures that must be available to applicants.45 However, the Convention does not 
prescribe the procedures to guarantee these rights. This is an important design element of the 
Aarhus Convention: it is open for global accession and thus must accommodate diverse 
political and legal cultures found in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) area and beyond.  
Moreover, in addition to playing a vital role in the creation of the Aarhus Convention, the EU 
has an influential position in how England and China guarantee the right of access to 
environmental information. England, due to the UK’s (current) membership to the EU, is 
obliged to implement the provisions of Directive 2003/4/EC, which transpose the obligations 
enshrined in the Aarhus Convention into EU law and is binding upon Member States. China 
is not bound to follow EU law, but the EU has established numerous programmes such as the 
EU-China Environmental Governance Programme,46 which act to promote the adoption of 
European principles underpinning environmental law into China’s legal system. In this way, 
the EU plays an influential role in how the right is guaranteed in these jurisdictions. 
It is within the frameworks of the Aarhus Convention and the EU that England and China 
have created domestic regimes to guarantee the right of access to environmental information. 
In England, the right is implemented through the EIR regime and in China through the 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information 2007 (OGI) 
and the Measures on Open Environmental Information 2007 (MOEI). Both regimes have 
adopted the same overall structure: they each provide a right of access to environmental 
information held by the state, which is triggered when a request for information is submitted 
to a public authority. On receiving a request for environmental information the public 
authority is obliged to decide, subject to various procedural obligations, whether to disclose 
                                                          
45 Art. 9. 
46 European Commission, ‘EU-China Environmental Governance Programme’, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eu-china-environmental-governance-programme_en.  
 
 
the requested information or whether to rely on an exemption and withhold disclosure. If the 
public authority decides to withhold the requested information, or if in reaching their decision 
they breach procedural obligations, individuals can seek to have the decision reviewed and, if 
successful, avail themselves of the remedies provided by the review body.   
While both regimes have adopted a similar structure to guarantee the right, there are 
significant differences in their regulatory frameworks. One difference is that the EIR regime 
operates in parallel with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) which is of national, 
rather than EU, origin and does not distinguish between environmental and other types of 
information. This arrangement does not occur in China. Conversely, it has been suggested 
that the CCP’s reason for guaranteeing the right in China is to entrench their domestic 
legitimacy as the ruling party47 rather than to empower citizens in environmental protection 
efforts. This assertion arises due to the implementation of China’s environmental information 
regime, which provides access to environmental information only when it portrays the CCP 
in a favourable light48 and attempts to minimise public engagement with state decision-
making processes.49 This differs from the underlying environmental democratic principles 
behind the Aarhus Convention which underpin the EIR regime in England. If so then it could 
act to undermine the transparency and environmental protection aims of the right itself in the 
Chinese context.  
                                                          
47 R. Williams, ‘China’s Transparency Two-Step: Reform and Control in the Wake of the Fourth Plenum’, 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (26 Nov. 2014), available at: http://journal.georgetown.edu/chinas-
transparency-two-step-reform-and-control-in-the-wake-of-the-fourth-plenum/. 
48 E. Economy, ‘How Long Can China Keep Pollution Data a Secret?’, ChinaFile (27 Feb. 2013), available at: 
http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/how-long-can-china-keep-pollution-data-state-secret and BBC, ‘Report: 
One Fifth of China’s Soil Contaminated’ (BBC, 18 Apr. 2014), available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-china-27076645. 
49 C. Yongxi, ‘An Empty Promise of Freedom of Information? Assessing the Legislative and Judicial Protection 
of the Right to Access Government Information in China’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Hong Kong, Sept. 2013), 
p. 116, available at: http://hub.hku.hk/handle/10722/197074. 
 
 
 
These differences are important because they influence the content of the domestic 
environmental information regimes in both jurisdictions. Indeed the differences between 
jurisdictions and their laws shapes the legal transplant process. Nonetheless, despite these 
differences it is important to note that both jurisdictions adopt the structure of the Aarhus 
Convention in establishing a framework for their environmental information regimes. This is 
important from the perspective of legal transplant theory, as the similarities in the structure of 
both regimes make it easier for the proposed legal transplants to be incorporated without 
being substantially altered.  
3.2. Public Authorities and Government Departments: The Scope of the Right of Access 
to Environmental Information 
The definition of ‘public authority’ is the first aspect of the English and Chinese 
environmental information regimes requiring analysis. Doing so is essential for delineating 
the scope of the right of access to environmental information, as only information held by 
public authorities is accessible under the Aarhus Convention.  
Under the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC, a public authority is defined as: 
(a) Government at national, regional and other level; 
(b) Natural or legal persons performing public administrative functions under national law, including 
specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment; 
(c) Any other natural or legal persons having public responsibilities or functions, or providing public 
services, in relation to the environment, under the control of a body or person falling within 
subparagraphs (a) or (b) above; 
(d) The institutions of any regional economic integration organization referred to in article 17 which is 
a Party to this Convention 
 
 
This definition does not include bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or legislative capacity50 
This definition is broad and covers all state bodies, not merely those related to the 
environment,51 which ensures that a wide range of interactions between the state and the 
public are covered by the obligations.   
In England, the provisions in the EIR that define ‘public authorities’ closely resemble the text 
of the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC. Under the EIR regime, four groups of 
bodies have been defined as public authorities: government departments:52 any public 
authority listed under Schedule 1 of the FOIA;53 any bodies or persons carrying out functions 
of a public administration;54 and any bodies or persons under the control of a public authority 
that has public responsibilities, exercises functions of a public nature or provides public 
services relating to the environment.55 Additionally, the EIR specifically excludes public 
authorities acting in a judicial or legislative capacity56 and the Houses of Parliament if its 
inclusion would infringe House privileges.57  
At first glance, the definition of ‘public authority’ in the EIR is compliant with the 
obligations imposed by the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC, as all government 
departments, not merely those with environmental remits, are covered by the EIR. However, 
this initial impression does not reflect the issues surrounding private entities that provide 
public services in England. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in Fish 
Legal and Emily Shirley58 that the appropriate approach to determine whether a body is a 
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public authority for the purpose of the EIR is to analyze whether the body in question is 
‘vested … with special powers’ beyond those granted by the normal operation of private law. 
The CJEU also held that, in determining whether a private entity is under the control of a 
public authority, the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC only require that the entity 
in question does not perform its functions ‘in a genuinely autonomous manner'.59 While this 
broadens the definition of ‘public authority’ in England to match the breadth of the Aarhus 
Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC, a degree of ambiguity still exists within the definition. 
As Reid has noted, the Upper Tribunal’s application of the CJEU’s ruling left open the 
question of whether an entity requires a range of ‘special powers’ to be defined as a public 
authority or whether a single ‘special power’ suffices.60 This is problematic, as such bodies 
can argue that a single ‘special power’ does not meet the ‘special powers’ test set out by the 
CJEU. Consequently, this can obfuscate the true scope of the EIR regime and the right of 
access to environmental information, and may confuse potential applicants in determinations 
whether they can submit requests for environmental information to private bodies that only 
have one ‘special power.’    
In stark contrast to the position in England, China does not encounter this issue of ambiguity 
in defining government departments for the purpose of its environmental information regime. 
Under the OGI and MOEI, ‘departments of the State Council, local people’s governments at 
all levels and departments under local people’s governments at the county level or above,’61 
including Environmental Protection Bureaus,62 are within the remit of the regime. This 
definition is broad, covering a wide range of executive bodies and, crucially, bodies that have 
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delegated powers to manage public functions.63 Additionally, all public enterprises and 
institutions that make or obtain government information while providing public services are 
encapsulated in this definition.64 This breadth is possible due to the greater role that the state 
plays in providing public utilities and in public-private partnerships.65 Without a socialist 
philosophy underpinning the supply of national utilities, such a broad definition is difficult to 
implement in practice. This approach is particularly interesting when compared with the 
scope of the Aarhus Convention; the breadth of the OGI and MOEI regime broadly matches 
the scope of the Aarhus Convention despite the Convention itself operating under a ‘market-
liberal’ economic model66 and not one informed by Marxist socialist values.  
Notwithstanding this positive aspect of the Chinese environmental information regime, a 
critical problem is that the CCP itself is not within the remit of the regime. This problem is 
unique to China. The Aarhus Convention and England also exclude political parties on the 
basis that they are directly accountable through democratic elections;67 however China, 
which does not utilize Western forms of democratic governance, does not have this degree of 
accountability. More concerningly, the CCP is China’s sole political party so it effectively 
exercises complete control over the state executive departments68 and promulgates policies 
that are applied at the local administrative level.69 This degree of control is not exercised by 
political parties in other jurisdictions. As a result of the CCP’s exclusion from the OGI and 
MOEI, large portions of the ‘real’ decision-making process in China are hidden from public 
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scrutiny.70 This position deviates from the Aarhus Convention, which covers bodies with this 
degree of executive power71 and would encapsulate the CCP if China ratified the 
Convention.72 Such a position is obviously problematic because it only provides a diluted 
form of transparency that insulates the CCP and undermines the environmental protection 
aims of the right and the Aarhus Convention. As such, the shortcomings in the Chinese 
regime impact upon the right of access to environmental information to, at least, hinder the 
effective implementation of the right at the broad scope envisioned by the Aarhus Convention 
or, at worst, render it illusory.  
However, the analysis also indicates various parallels between the Chinese and English 
regimes which, in turn, can act as sources of inspiration for legal transplants. England could 
remedy the ambiguities in defining private entities that provide public services as public 
authorities, by looking to the broad definition used in China which encapsulates all entities 
performing public functions. This would eliminate the uncertainty in determining whether a 
private entity providing a public service is, for the purposes of the EIR, a public authority. 
Moreover, it could do so without requiring applicants, who generally do not have legal 
training, to apply the ‘special powers’ test. This makes it easier for applicants to submit 
requests under the regime and broadens the accessibility of the right. However, in practice, 
adopting this transplant may be difficult because England lacks the degree of state control 
that China has over the provision of public utilities73 which makes such a broad definition 
possible. Notwithstanding this potential obstacle, it must be noted that the Chinese definition 
of government departments matches the broad scope of the Aarhus Convention whereby the 
structure of public utilities does not absolve the state of its obligation to provide access to 
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environmental information.74 The ideological convergence between the Aarhus Convention 
and Chinese law adds a degree of legitimacy to the Chinese provisions, and may act to 
surmount the difficulties raised by the different structures of public utilities and make the 
proposed transplant more feasible.   
Conversely it would also be difficult for China to look to and adopt a specific provision in the 
English EIR regime as a means of legal reform. This is not because of the text of the OGI and 
MOEI, which does match the scope of the Aarhus Convention. Rather, it is how the 
provisions are applied in practice, which shields the CCP in its role as the executive and 
breaches the spirit of the Convention’s provisions. This is not to say that China cannot look 
towards England for inspiration; rather, it must look towards the spirit of transparency woven 
through the provisions of the EIR instead of focusing on a specific provision. The current 
Chinese regime clearly does not deliver on the promise of transparency because it hides large 
portions of the CCP’s decision-making processes from public scrutiny. Abolishing this 
exclusion, while not strictly following the text of the Aarhus Convention and the EIR, would 
follow the spirit of these instruments and harness the right to information. 
Naturally it is debatable whether the CCP, acting as the ‘legal elite’, would ever consider this 
transplant. On the one hand, the CCP may only have implemented the right of access to 
environmental information to shore up its domestic legitimacy. By providing a diluted form 
of transparency that excludes itself, the CCP simultaneously addresses some transparency 
concerns while maintaining control over the flow of information between the state and 
Chinese citizens. On the other hand, guaranteeing the right of access to environmental 
information normatively erodes the CCP’s control of information. The international influence 
of the Aarhus Convention and the EU, alongside the example set by England, may pressure 
the introduction of further reforms. Additionally, since Chinese citizens are now more likely 
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to take action in order to hold the state to account,75 the introduction of the OGI and MOEI 
regime can be said to have precipitated a cultural change as well. This cultural shift may act 
to push the CCP into adopting this proposed transplant, despite this counteracting its interests 
as China’s ‘legal elite.’     
3.3. Exceptions and Exemptions to the Right of Access to Environmental Information in 
England and China 
A key element of the Aarhus Convention, Directive 2003/4/EC, and the domestic 
environmental information regimes of England and China, is the ability of public authorities 
to refuse requests for access in certain circumstances. This is important because, while states 
do hold information in the public interest, public authorities need to be able to withhold 
sensitive information that may cause harm if disclosed. At the international level, the Aarhus 
Convention sets out two categories of information that are exempt from the obligation of 
disclosure on request. The first category is general in nature and concerns whether the 
authority holds the information;76 whether the information is in the course of completion or 
constitutes an internal communication;77 and whether the request is ‘manifestly unreasonable’ 
or too general.78 The second category protects a range of specific interests that can be 
adversely affected by the disclosure of sensitive information. These interests are broad, 
ranging from international relations, national security, public security79 and the privacy rights 
of individuals.80 Requests for environmental information can also be refused under this 
category if it relates to confidentiality of commercial or industrial information, when such 
                                                          
75 T. Johnson, ‘Environmental Information Disclosure in China: Policy Development and NGO Responses’ 
(2011) 39(3) Policy and Politics, pp. 399-416, at 401; and S. Hoffman & J. Sullivan, ‘Environmental Protests 
Expose Weakness in China’s Leadership’, Forbes, 22 June 2015, available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesasia/2015/06/22/environmental-protests-expose-weakness-in-chinas-
leadership/#58b74a6b2f09. 
76 Aarhus Convention, n. 2 above, Art. 4(3)(a).  
77 Ibid., Art. 4(3)(c). 
78 Ibid., Art. 4(3)(b). 
79 Ibid., Art. 4(4)(b). 
80 Ibid., Art. 4(4)(e). 
 
 
protection is granted by law,81 and if the disclosure of the requested information would 
impair environmental protection efforts.82 Directive 2003/4/EC follows a similar division of 
exceptions and protects an identical set of interests.83 
In addition to setting the scope of the exceptions themselves, the Aarhus Convention and 
Directive 2003/4/EC place limits on how they can be used. Under both instruments, public 
authorities are obliged to interpret exceptions restrictively and must disclose the information 
if the public interest in withholding the information from disclosure is outweighed by the 
public interest in having the requested information released.84 Furthermore, the exceptions 
operate under a presumption of disclosure,85 which further increases the likelihood of the 
requested environmental information being disclosed. These conditions prevent public 
authorities from unduly withholding sensitive information to hide wrongdoing, and play an 
important role in ensuring that the right of access to environmental information is effectively 
guaranteed.  
In implementing the exceptions enshrined in the Aarhus Convention, England has directly 
transposed the text of the Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC into the EIR regime.86 The 
interests protected by the EIR87 mirror those found in these instruments. The EIR exceptions 
also operate under a presumption of disclosure88 similar to that articulated in the Aarhus 
Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC. This presumption works alongside the public interest 
test, which states that a refusal based on one of the exceptions can be overruled if it is in the 
public interest for the requested information to be disclosed.89 The public interest test acts as 
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an additional safeguard in the public authority’s determination on whether to disclose or 
withhold the requested information, where the public authority must weigh the considerations 
for disclosing and withholding the requested information.90 In applying the public interest 
test, the public authority can take into account the promotion of participation in 
environmental matters; the free exchange of views and a greater awareness of environmental 
issues.91 Additionally, public authorities can aggregate the weight of the exceptions in 
deciding whether or not to disclose the requested environmental information.92 While this 
does have the potential to undermine the restrictive interpretation of the exceptions promoted 
by the Aarhus Convention,93 in practice overlapping interests are discounted from the 
aggregation process94 and the general approach of considering the weight each individual 
interest should be accorded95 limits the impact of this power. In obliging public authorities to 
follow these steps, the EIR regime is predisposed towards disclosing the requested 
information, following the aims of the Aarhus Convention. This predisposition is arguably to 
be expected, considering the shared Western liberal background of the UK and the Aarhus 
Convention.  
However, despite strict adherence to the text of the Convention, England has had mixed 
success to date in effectively implementing the exceptions. For example, in applying the 
exception relating to relating to international relations, defence, national security or public 
safety, 96 the EIR grants public authorities the discretion to neither confirm nor deny holding 
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the information when responding to a request for access.97 This is justified on the basis that, 
in certain instances, even revealing the existence of the requested information is akin to 
disclosing it and can have a negative impact on the public interest. Notwithstanding the 
strength of this justification, the power to neither confirm nor deny is not mentioned in the 
Aarhus Convention or Directive 2003/4/EC and, in fact, contradicts the obligation to reason 
refusals.98 The English approach breaches both the letter and spirit of the Aarhus Convention 
because if such a response is issued by the public authority the applicant will not know the 
basis for the refusal. Consequently, the applicant will be unable to make an informed decision 
as to the prospects of having the decision reviewed, which undermines their ability to enforce 
their right of access to environmental information. 
In addition to this, the implementation of the exception relating to the secrecy of commercial 
and industrial information has been problematic. Under the provisions of the EIR, 
information relating to commercial or trade secrets can be withheld from disclosure if it 
protects a legitimate economic interest and the information is designated as confidential by 
law.99 The designation of confidentiality can be done through both statute and case law,100 
but if it is granted through case law then the information must be imparted to the public 
authority ‘in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.’101 This means that 
information that is created between a public authority and a private body does not fall within 
the exception because it cannot be said to have been ‘imparted.’ This has a mixed impact on 
the right: while it does ensure that public authorities are fully transparent in their dealings 
with private bodies, private bodies are less likely to share information with public authorities 
if there is a risk of the information being disclosed to the public. Additionally, private bodies 
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are also less likely to work alongside public authorities, thereby potentially hindering state-
led environmental protection efforts in the private sector and conflicting with the overarching 
environmental aims of the Convention and the right itself. 
Unlike England, China has not directly transposed the text of the Aarhus Convention, yet the 
OGI and MOEI regime has adopted a similar structure to the Convention and the English 
EIR. The Chinese regime broadly protects the same interests as those listed in the 
Convention, albeit defined less precisely,102 and includes: protecting state secrets;103 
commercial and trade secrets;104 individual privacy;105 and the ‘three securities and one 
stability’,106 under which Government departments are entitled to withhold information from 
disclosure if it endangers state security, public security or economic security.107 Chinese 
government departments, in certain instances, must also undertake a public interest test, 
balancing the public interest in disclosure with the public interest in withholding the 
information. While not identical to the test seen in the Aarhus Convention, the Chinese public 
interest test also creates an additional stage in the government department’s determination on 
whether to disclose certain types of sensitive information. It is interesting to note that certain 
aspects of China’s OGI and MOEI regime have been more successful in matching the 
standards set by the Aarhus Convention than its English counterpart. One instance of this can 
be seen in its application of the state secret exemption, where government departments are 
obliged to provide a reason for the refusal to disclose108 and cannot rely on discretionary 
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power to neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested information. Another 
example can be seen in how government departments do not require information to be 
‘imparted’ in order to apply the exemption relating to commercial and trade secrets. These 
aspects of the OGI and MOEI regime are important, as they indicate a willingness from 
China to meet the standards of guaranteeing the right of access to environmental information 
as espoused by the Aarhus Convention. 
However, while on the surface the Chinese environmental information regime complies with 
the obligations set by the Aarhus Convention, this is not the case in practice. The CCP has 
altered, or in some instances chosen not to adopt, certain elements of the Aarhus Convention 
in order to achieve its own political goals. This can be seen in the CCP’s initial refusal to 
disclose a report on contaminated arable land109 and the difficulties in accessing information 
on the disposal of hazardous waste.110 Consequently, the right of access to environmental 
information is undermined and provides only a diluted form of transparency. This is 
evidenced in the range of information that can be withheld under the OGI and the MOEI, 
specifically the provision relating to the ‘three securities and one stability.’ While these 
exemptions are uncontentious, and features in both the Aarhus Convention and England’s 
EIR regime, the provision also allows government departments to exempt information that 
threatens the ‘social stability’ of the state.111 This exemption provides government 
departments with a large degree of discretion, and what is considered to threaten the ‘social 
stability’ can change depending on the priorities of the incumbent CCP leader.112 As a result 
of this wide discretion and inclusion of ‘social stability’ as a protected interest, government 
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departments have withheld information on environmental incidents113 and hindered 
environmental protest groups,114 contrary to the aims of the Aarhus Convention. This is a 
consequence of the CCP’s totalitarian rule: in order to maintain the one party system, the 
CCP needs to ensure that information that is potentially harmful to the CCP’s domestic image 
is not disclosed, thereby necessitating the use of this exemption. It is telling that the 
environmental information regime in England, which uses a democratic system of 
governance, does not contain such an exemption. 
The dilution of the right of access to environmental information can also be seen in other 
divergences between the Chinese environmental information regime and the Aarhus 
Convention. While China obliges government departments to provide the reason for 
withholding information,115 there is no clear presumption of disclosure nor any discretion to 
disclose the information if there are considerations in favour of disclosure.116 This provides 
government departments with a great degree of discretion to justify a refusal to disclose 
environmental information, particularly in instances where such disclosure would embarrass 
the CCP.117 As such, the CCP is able to maintain its stranglehold over the flow of information 
and prevent efforts to improve the transparency of its governance, contrary to the aims of the 
Aarhus Convention. 
A similar divergence from the procedures of the Aarhus Convention can also be seen in the 
public interest test contained in the OGI and MOEI regime. Utilized in the exemptions 
relating to commercial and trade secrets and individual privacy, the OGI and MOEI oblige 
state bodies to identify the public interest and analyze the impact that withholding the 
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requested information would have on it.118 While superficially similar, this test inverts the 
public interest test under the Aarhus Convention119 and the English EIR,120 focusing on the 
harm that would be caused by non-disclosure as opposed to how the public interest is served 
by disclosure.121 The Chinese public interest test has a negative impact on the right of access 
to environmental information as it predisposes state bodies to withhold information from 
disclosure. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the decision is generally based on 
whether the impact of non-disclosure would ‘far exceed’ the impact on other related 
interests,122 which creates a high threshold to overcome.123 Clearly, these practices diverge 
from the generally accepted standards set by the Convention, and it is here we can see how 
the transparency aims of the Aarhus Convention conflict with the domestic legitimacy 
concerns of the CCP. Consequently, this has a negative impact on the right’s goals to 
promote environmental democracy and transparency in China. 
In contemplating the shortcomings in English and Chinese implementations of the exceptions 
to the right of access to environmental information, legal transplant theory can help to 
formulate proposals for legal reform. One shortcoming in England’s regime is the 
requirement for information to be ‘imparted’ for the EIR’s commercial and industrial 
information exception to be applied, which stifles collaborative partnerships between the 
public and private sector. A potential transplant is for England to follow the example of 
China and abolish the requirement to ‘impart information.’ China, which has no such 
requirement, has seen an increase in such partnerships124 and it is plausible that the low 
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likelihood of commercially sensitive information being disclosed through such partnerships is 
a reason for this uptake. This increased uptake of public/private partnerships is to China’s 
benefit for two reasons: firstly, the economic savings generated by such partnerships125 can 
be redistributed to other projects, such as environmental protection efforts; and, secondly, the 
state can influence how private parties conduct business, redirecting them towards more 
environmentally friendly business practices. These benefits act to promote the overarching 
aims of the Aarhus Convention. England therefore has a strong incentive to consider adopting 
this transplant, despite it being sourced from an entirely different political and legal model. 
Another potential transplant relates to the public authorities’ ability to neither confirm nor 
deny the existence of information under the national security exception. In contrast to 
England, China does not allow government bodies to refuse to provide the reason for the 
request126 and, in this instance, is in full compliance with the standards set by the Aarhus 
Convention. England, therefore, may wish to follow the example set by China and abolish the 
power to neither confirm nor deny. In considering whether England can successfully adopt 
such a transplant, it must be noted that this particular transplant matches with the Western 
democratic values that underlie both England and the Aarhus Convention, and indeed mirrors 
the obligation contained in the Aarhus Convention. It is due to the procedural and ideological 
similarity between the Aarhus Convention and the Chinese provisions on this issue that this 
proposed transplant could be successfully adopted by England, thereby bringing its legal 
framework more closely into line with the requirements of the Convention.  
China can also benefit from looking towards England to seek legal reforms. One particular 
set of transplants that China should consider incorporating is the English public interest test 
and the presumption of disclosure into the OGI and MOEI regime. By adopting these 
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procedures into its environmental information regime, China would redress the discretionary 
powers available to government departments that weight the request process towards non-
disclosure. In turn, this would provide a more robust and effective means for citizens to 
utilize their right of access to environmental information. However, while these proposed 
transplants would help China to fully operationalize the right of access to environmental 
information, they also conflict with the CCP’s aim of maintaining control over the flow of 
information. To an extent, the two aims oppose each other and cannot coexist within the same 
legal system. This, however, ignores the ultimate objective of maintaining control over the 
flow of information: to continue to improve the legitimacy of the CCP at the domestic and 
international level. The latter aim may ultimately trump the former and narrower aim of 
controlling the flow of information due to the change in how China’s citizens and Chinese 
environmental non-government organizations (NGOs), wish to be engaged in environmental 
protection efforts.127 If the CCP cannot respond to this increased desire on the part of China’s 
citizens to access environmental information held by the State, then it is probable that they 
will lose some of their domestic legitimacy as the ruling party. Indeed, it is likely that, if this 
transplant were proposed, it would be on the initiative of Chinese environmental NGOs 
which, according to some commentators, play an increasingly important, albeit still limited, 
role in influencing decisions made by the CCP.128 Additionally, in order to not be seen as 
acting contrary to the generally accepted norms of the Aarhus Convention, China may be 
pressured by the international community to adopt these transplants. Hence, despite the 
tension between certain aims of the CCP and the proposed transplant, if proposed, China 
might consider adopting it into its current environmental information regime.  
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It is particularly interesting to contrast this with any proposed transplant relating to the ‘social 
stability’ exemption contained within the OGI and MOEI. One clear point is that neither the 
Aarhus Convention nor the EIR regime contains such a broad exemption, and that the use of 
this exemption in China provides more opportunity for Chinese government departments to 
withhold environmental information in comparison to their Western counterparts. As such, a 
potential reform that could be adopted by China is to abolish the exemption. While this is not 
a transplant as defined by Watson, which requires that a law be placed into the receiving 
jurisdiction to be defined as a transplant,129 the reform encounters the encounters the same 
clash of values as transplanting the presumption of disclosure and the public interest test. 
However, this provision in the OGI and MOEI can be distinguished from the previously 
identified issues. This distinction arises from the fact that the social stability exemption 
epitomizes a fundamental aspect of the Marxist form of socialist government.130 This lends a 
degree of cultural significance to the exemption that is lacking in the procedural elements of 
the public interest test and presumption of disclosure. Consequently, because it is intrinsically 
connected to the political and social fabric of China, the CCP is unlikely to abolish the ‘social 
stability’ exemption to match the Western values enshrined by the Aarhus Convention, even 
if such a reform would better guarantee the right of access to environmental information. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The right of access to environmental information plays a key role in modern environmental 
governance. It empowers citizens to act as stewards for the environment, allowing them to 
actively participate in environmental decision-making procedures, act as enforcers for 
environmental regulations, and protest against environmental harms caused by the state. 
                                                          
129 While outwith the scope of this article, this raises an interesting question regarding the nature of legal 
transplants, and whether the definition of what constitutes a legal transplant should be enlarged to include 
reforms which are based on the general aims and spirit of the donor system’s laws. 
130 Marx, n. 35 above, p. 2. 
 
 
However, in order for the right to be effectively guaranteed it must be implemented with a set 
of procedural rights that govern which bodies are within the scope of the right and how public 
authorities process and determine information requests. Enshrined in the Aarhus Convention, 
these procedural rights are vital to ensure that requests are processed in a way that furthers 
the environmental protection aims of the right. Both England and China, despite their 
political, social and legal differences, have looked towards the overarching framework of the 
Aarhus Convention in their attempt to effectively implement the right of access to 
environmental information. 
Both jurisdictions have encountered shortcomings in fully guaranteeing the right in line with 
the Aarhus Convention’s obligations. These shortcomings are not uniform between the 
jurisdictions. Reflecting the different social concerns and legal architecture used to 
implement the right, each jurisdiction has separate areas in which improvements are required 
and areas in which they have successfully incorporated the requirements of the Aarhus 
Convention into their domestic environmental information regime. It is the differences 
between the respective regimes that can act as reciprocal inspirations for legal reforms under 
legal transplant theory. The application of legal transplant theory between these two 
jurisdictions, and the conclusion that both jurisdictions can offer legal transplants that are 
likely to be successfully adopted by the other, raises a variety of interesting findings.  
Firstly, regardless of where a transplant is sourced from, and the cultural elements attached to 
it, if the proposed transplant matches the obligations enshrined in the Aarhus Convention it is 
more likely to be successfully adopted. This is due to the status of the Aarhus Convention as 
the keystone legal instrument, and the associated legitimacy that complying with the 
Convention confers on States. This idea of legitimacy is identified as a driver by legal 
transplant theory, and may help to carry transplants across jurisdictions with vastly different 
legal and political systems and social values. Indeed, the legitimacy and associated prestige 
 
 
with complying with the normative values of the Aarhus Convention can drive England to 
adopt China’s approach to exempting commercial and industrial information from disclosure, 
despite their very different views on capitalism. This underlying idea of legitimacy also 
drives China to adopt legal transplants from England, as far as they help China to comply 
with the normative values of the Aarhus Convention. However, as can be evidenced by the 
difficulty of reforming the “social stability” exemption, the political culture of the CCP can 
act to hinder such transplants from occurring. As such, the concept of legitimacy derived 
through the Aarhus Convention is not always enough to overcome domestic obstacles in 
promoting the adoption of legal transplants. 
Secondly, China guaranteeing the right of access to environmental information, which is 
based on Western values of transparency and governance, may be indicative of a shift in 
China’s relationship between the state and its citizens. By allowing citizens to access 
information held by government bodies and thereby opening these bodies up to scrutiny, 
China has departed from a long-held position of secrecy that has its roots in Confucian 
values. Serving as a means to resolve issues caused by China’s severe environmental 
degradation, the right may continue to influence how Chinese citizens perceive their 
relationship with the state and pull China further towards Western values. However, this is 
not guaranteed: as evidenced by the CCP’s exclusion from the OGI and MOEI regime, the 
CCP has altered the scope of the right to fit into the Chinese style of top-down governance. 
As such, instead of pulling China to the West, what might develop is a mix of the Aarhus 
Convention’s Western focus on transparency with Chinese political values. 
These highlighted points are of particular value to deepen our understanding of legal 
transplant theory by identifying key aspects of the application of this theory. Legal 
 
 
transplants are the most ‘fertile source of development‘131 for legal systems and it is possible 
that England and China could reform their respective environmental information regimes 
through the adoption of transplants. The transplants analyzed in this article, as shaped by the 
international framework of the Aarhus Convention and the particular national characteristics 
of England and China, seek not only to improve how the right is guaranteed but serve as an 
indication of how the right of access to environmental information will continue to develop 
into the future. Ultimately, the provision of environmental information is a key factor in 
engaging members of civil society and empowering them to act as environmental stewards. In 
considering how legal transplants can help improve implementation of the right to seek 
environmental information from the state, the ‘legal elite’ in both England and China could 
better promote the values of environmental stewardship and protection enshrined in the 
Aarhus Convention.  
                                                          
131 Watson, n. 17 above, p. 95. 
